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I. Introduction 
Individual accounts, interpretations, and critiques 
of a situation consistently portray a "reality" documented 
by objective, factual evidence. Seldom, however, does such 
a presentation betray an awareness that facts themselves 
arise out of a most subjective process of gathering, selec-
ting, and weighting of but a tiny proportion of available 
information. What appears to be uncontestable reality, 
objectively documented, is thus a subjectively interpreted 
reality supported by very personally perceived facts. 
Perhaps such a statement appears more fitting as the cen-
tral contention in a conclusion ·rather than an opening 
statement. However, the original aim of my research was 
altered and rechanneled to such a degree that a prelimin-
ary explanation is necessary. I originally set out to do 
a case study of an internationally attention-attracting 
event: the election of Salvador Allende as President of 
Chile and his subsequent downfall three years later. While 
living and studying in France during the academic year 
1975-76 and again in 1978, I observed considerable specu-
lation about the significance of the world's first demo-
cratically elected marxist chief-of-state in the most 
"Europeanized" nation of Latin America. Attempts to draw 
inspirational parallels for French and Italian marxist 
parties abounded. Not surprisingly, Allende's overthrow 
in September, 1973 evoked immediate responses throughout 
Europe. Orthodox marxists victoriously, if grimly, warned 
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against the fallacy of the "peaceful road to socialism" 
and preached inevitable revolution as the only way. Mod-
erate socialists' hopes for a more palatable, less violent 
road to socialism plummeted overnight. Back home in the 
United States I discovered the significance of Allende's 
accession to, and fall from, power increasing as speculation 
and debate skyrocketed about alleged and documented U. s. 
intervention, both public and private, in Chile. I thus 
embarked on a detailed study of Chile during the Allende 
years with the expressed goal of better understanding the 
events which led to Allende's downfall. 
At the outset of this study, I discovered that a 
plethora of socio-political literature had already been 
written both in the United States and Europe. Faced with 
an abundance of very diverse, even contradictory, material 
describing, analyzing, and judging the Allende experience, 
I came to the realization that yet another account based 
on second-hand sources would be· of minimal value. Amidst 
the confusion, uncertainty, and disagreement over why 
Allende failed and the condition of Chile under the Unidad 
Popular (UP) government, I found qualitative discrepancies 
in different writers' assumptions of certain "objective 
realities" proven by certain documented "facts." Conse-
quently, the process of my research directed me to reflect 
further about the perceptual frameworks within which var-
ious writers have studied, analyzed, and critiqued Allende's 
Chile. Such reflection propelled me into restructuring my 
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endeavor from solely analyzing Chile under Allende to ana-
lyzing the analyses. 
Recalling the case for a perceptual approach to in-
ternational relations as outlined in a widely used text-
book, I sought to establish a theoretical base in the so-
ciology of knowledge as explored and defined in Peter L. 
Berger's and Thomas Luckmann's the Social Construction of 
Reality. 1 Subtitled A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, 
Berger's and Luckmann's book describes the relationship 
between structural realities which appear as objective 
facticities independent of one's desires and perceptions, 
and the human process of constructing and defining these 
realities. The dialectical relationship between social reality 
and, in Berger's and Luckmann's words, "the human enterprise 
of constructing reality" is the focus of the book. The 
reference to such a dialectic can be traced back to Marx, 
but Berger and Luckmann break new ground in recognizing 
the need for incorporating the dialectical process in a 
conceptual framework which bears upon the theoretical 
orientation of the scientist or analyst. Berger and Luck-
mann redefine the sociology of knowledge and the role of 
the empirical sociologist in order to explore the full 
significance of a systematic account of how "facts" and 
"realities" are accepted within society as such and thereby 
assimilated into a social body of knowledge. This social 
body of knowledge becomes objectified and institutionalized, 
creating "structural realities" which, in turn, are inter-
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nalized and legitimized. "Reality'' acquires an independent 
existence even though it is the product of human definition 
and construction. 2 
Berger's and Luckmann's treatise in the sociology of 
knowledge elucidates the process of reality-construction 
and provides concepts with which to view Chilean society 
as an amalgamation of many differently perceived realities. 
Since no single objective reality was widely perceived during 
the tumultuous Allende period of socio-political upheaval, 
an inevitable cloud hovers over that period. Henae, it 
should not be too surprising that the multitude of analysts 
and experts who have written about Allende often hold quite 
divergent opinions about what was and what was not hap-
pening in Chile under Allende. 
II. Recognition of a Multiplicity 
of Realities 
1. Basis of International Relations ~l'rheory. A beginning 
student in international relations cannot go far before 
recognizing that nations or societies see things in often 
fundamentally different ways. Rosen and Jones, in their 
introductory text, explain the necessity for a perceptual 
approach to understanding relations between n~tions. National 
societies · maintain distinct perceptual systems which uncover 
and accept different fundamental facts supporting different 
realities; these realities define the parameters within 
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which international events are perceived and national ac-
tions are justified. Perceptual systems, encompassing a 
set of values, beliefs, and cognitions, are established and 
modified primarily according to incoming cognitions or 
"facts." One easily recognizes the subjective, personal 
nature of values and beliefs but is less ready to admit the 
subjectivity of facts themselves. However, cognitions or 
facts do not necessarily represent autonomous realities, 
independent of the perceiver. Facts are selected from an 
infinite array of potentially available information, are 
given meaning through interpretation, and, finally, are 
ordered in their relative importance to other facts. Only 
after this very subjective human process of selection, in-
terpretation, and evaluation do facts become endowed with 
an objective, i.e., an independent, status of their own. 
Realities substantiated by objective facticities actually 
reflect different perceptual systems engaged in defining 
and acquiring acceptable bodies of knowledge, a knowledge 
of "reality." David Easton himself defines a fact as 
" ••• but a peculiar ordering of reality according to a theo-
retic interest."3 Thus, an introduction to international 
relations includes the defining of reality as the product 
of social and theoretical perception; implied is the existence 
of a multiplicity of realities rather than one absolute and 
objective reality. 
2. Chile's Social Diversity. Allende's Chile presents 
an excellent case study in the existence of a multiplicity 
of perceived realities. Just as perceptual processes define 
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the core of international relations, so too do they charac-
terize intra-national relations, relations between different 
societal groups. 
Chilean society historically has been fragmented into 
numerous socio-economic groups. Understanding the multi-
plicity of realities perceived by Chileans themselves during 
Allende's socio-political "experiment" requires an under-
standing of the genuine diversity of Chilean society; some 
accounts of Allende's Chile written by experts from northern 
hemisphere industrialized nations lead one to wonder if a 
true appreciation for the degree of fragmentation common to 
most Third World societies exists. The social diversity 
found in a modern, industrialized nation should not be 
equated with social fragmentation characterizing a less 
developed country (LDC ) . Expecially critical to guard against 
while viewing Chile is the assumed existence of a "broad, 
middle class" on the fringes of which are miscellaneous 
groups. For many North Americans and Europeans the often 
used terrn"middle class" implies the majority or average 
class. In Chile, a careful look into the composition of 
society reveals the co-existence of several quite distinct 
population groups, none of which can claim to represent the 
majority, average, or centrist class. Indeed, a historical 
trend towards greater fragmentation and polarization has 
characterized Chile and, for this reason, any attempt to 
uncover one "objective reality" relevant to all of Chilean 
society is bound to fall prey to oversimplification. 
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Chile's often interrelated landed oligarchy and urban 
bourgeoisie form the socio-political and economic elite, a 
status seldom shared so all-inclusively by even the wealthy 
upper echelons of the industrialized capitalist nations. 
At the time of Allende's accession to power, this elite 
probably shared the most unified "class consciousness" 
within Chile. Though the traditional rural oligarchy owes 
considerable economic and political power to its extensive 
landholdings, much of the urban bourgeoisie's power directly 
emerges from its close ties and involvement with the power-
ful foreign sectors of Chile's economy. Such sectors have 
included the foreign monopolies in copper, iron, nitrates, 
electricity, and telecommunications. Often working for for-
eign firms as national managers of multinational corporate 
branches, and drawing a variety of tangible and intangible 
benefits from close contact with the "center" of the world's 
international capitalist system, 4 the urban bourgeoisie 
perceives its economic self-interest to lie with the br?ader 
interests of the foreign sectors. 
Chile's middle class, a social grouping alluded to by 
many analysts despite the aforementioned danger of employing 
such a connotative term, includes lawyers, physicians, and 
other professionals, along with small business owners5 and 
white collar workers. The middle class shares some similarity 
in economic well-being and social prestige but lacks a class 
consciousness because of competing hopes and fears, 6 For 
the class, as a whole, its long-term economic and political 
interests lie in genuine national economic development 
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rather than in continued maintenance of the dependent eco-
nomic status which primarily benefits the foreign sector and 
national elite tied to the foreign sector. Yet, fear of 
losing ground to a strengthened proletariat and peasant 
base in the event of a radical restructuring of the polit-
ical economy, coupled with the hope for economic advancement 
within the present system renders the middle class vul-
nerable to alternating appeals from elites above for alle-
giance to the status quo, and from the groups below for 
radical change. Renato Sandri describes the middle class 
"fluctuating between the mirage of the upper classes and the 
uncertainty of their ~i€} own real condition." 7 
Moving downward, Chile's proletariat knows a low standard 
of living, harbors little hope of attaining real economic 
gains in the current political-economic structure, and is 
confronted with the possibility of losing employment or 
finding subsistence-level wages so undermined by inflation 
that it risks joining the poverty-stricken unemployed urban 
slumdwellers and rural poor. Preceding and during Allende's 
presidency, however, the working class experienced a dynamic, 
rising class consciousness with seemingly unlimited potential. 
Popular mobilizations demanding and sometimes effecting real 
structural change in Chile's economic institutions increased 
significantly. Yet even this group experienced some frag-
mentation between those workers who received higher wages 
by working in the economy's foreign sector and those who did 
8 not. Class division also appeared between those workers 
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who sought immediate economic gains,9 considering any gains 
rightfully theirs, and workers who realized the necessity 
of foregoing immediate benefits, rightfully theirs or not, 
to achieve more permanent, long-term gains associated with 
the establishment of new political and economic institutions. 
Chile's poorest and probably largest social sector 
includes urban slumdewllers, peasants, and Indians. This 
broad group lives in the worst poverty, facing the task of 
daily survival, receiving, and expecting few, if any, benefits 
from the national political and economic institutions. Un-
like Chile's elite and middle class, this mass of rural and 
urban poor has nothing to lose and most to gain by dramatic 
change; yet, the scattered and isolated poor lack much hope, 
vision, or common consciousness of the possibility for radical 
transformation of Chilean society. "Stability" for this 
large sector of the population means little more than the 
continuation of a system which exploits, oppresses, and 
tolerates great suffering. 
In summary, far from containing a relatively homo-
geneous population, Chilean society encompasses several 
distinctly dissimilar and unequal population groups. Each 
of these groups necessarily perceives the social reality 
as quite different. Each group forms a "sub-society0 and 
is exposed to very different living and learning situations, 
different certainties and challenges, different struggles 
and hopes. Individuals within these sub-societies come to 
know different "things" as certain and as having a real, 
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tangible existence. For one group, a high consumption 
lifestyle is taken for granted. For another group, hunger 
or unemployment is a daily reality, a fact of life. Within 
these respective population groups both extremes are seldom 
perceived as extremes. Rather, different standards of living 
and different experiences repeatedly familiar from day-to-
day become accepted as actual, independent conditions of 
life, as "facts." Being in or under control of societal 
institutions, exploiter or exploited, is such a fact. 
These facts yield very different expectations and aspira-
tions. The composite body of these perceived facts and 
feelings within one population group forms a social body 
of knowledge which in turn determines an external, "objec-
tive" reality. 10 Each social sector thus perceives a unique 
social reality. 
However, only certain perceived realities are success-
fully projected as "national" realities--as realities rele-
vant for the entire society. The proletariat and e:specially 
the marginal groups of peasants, Indians, and urban poor 
have been repressed consistently and powerfully, able to 
contribute little to the national perception of social real-
ity. With the electoral shift from the far right to an in-
creasingly moderate and progressive center, and culminating 
in Allende's victory of the moderate left, many more of the 
various groups within Chilean society began playing a more 
active role in the society. No longer could the small wealthy 
elite project their own limited notion of reality as the 
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only national social reality. The diversity of Chilean 
society unfolded as socio-political upheaval, climaxing 
under Allende, released hitherto repressed alternative inter-
pretations of social reality, each coinciding with a different 
set of perceived facts. 
III. Social Constructions of Reality 
1. Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. At this 
point, Berger's and Luckmann's treatise in the sociology 
of knowledge adds invaluable insight into the process of 
the "social construction of reality." How do societies come 
to accept and "know0 particular realities? This is the under-
lying question of their treatise; consideration of this 
question will hopefully shed new light on why members of a 
society entertain sometimes radically different notions of 
objective reality. 
Berger and Luckmann discuss in the central part of their 
treatise the concepts of "objectivation," "institutionaliza-
tion," and "legitimation" which elucidate the process by 
which subjective human activity results in the formation of 
independent objective realities. This process defines the 
relationship between social reality or structural realities 
and the human activity which constructs that reality. 
Examination of this relationship will provide a more subtle 
appreciation for the notion of "reality." More particularly, 
the reason for such a multiplicity of perceived realities, 
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both by groups and individuals within Chilean society and 
by analysts looking in upon Chilean society, will become 
clearer. 
a. Objectivation. "Objectivation" of human activity 
creates the foundation for knowledge in everyday life upon 
which a social construction of reality takes place. Human 
activity is the expression of subjective meaning in one's 
life. At the same time, the product or result of an in-
dividual's or group's activity becomes independent or ex-
ternalized and attains a certain objectivity. Objectivation 
is then the objectifying of subjective meanings. On a personal 
level, the activity of communicating very private and inner 
thoughts leads to the creation of an external language. 
Language becomes a very physical, objective structure in-
dependent of any one individual. On a societal level, social 
groups engage in political activity reflecting their own 
social experiences; in the process, that political activity 
becomes objectified in the form of political institutions 
and ideas which are transformed into controlling mechanisms 
over societal groups. Thus, internally held meanings and 
perceptions become externalized and objectified, creating 
language on one level and political institutions on another. 
"Knowledge" is the familiarity one achieves with the 
body of objectified material in a society, The ongoing 
process of objectivation creates a social body or "stock" 
of knowledge, to use Berger's and Luckmann's term. The 
"social stock of knowledge" orders, restricts, and sim-
plifies the vast amount of potentially available information 
in one's environment. The social stock of knowledge provides 
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a common link with others' subjective meanings, permits the 
location of oneself or of one's group within society, and 
enables more efficient human activity in the form of every-
day routines. Routines narrow the range of daily decisions 
which have to be made; consideration of alternative methods 
of performing an activity is minimized. Objectivation leads 
not only to the creation of a social stock of knowledge 
but also to the creation of the social order itself. The 
social order arises out of that portion of human activity 
which becomes subject to habitualization. Habitualized 
activity makes possible the incorporation of routines into 
the social body of knowledge. 
Briefly, the sum of each individual's and group's 
objectifying activities results in the creation of a social 
stock of knowledge. Repeated events, situations, and living 
experiences accumulate in a person's memory, gradually coming 
to be perceived as certainties or facts existing indepen-
dently of that person; those facts which confront many people 
similarly within a society become objectified into that 
society's social body of knowledge. From this social body 
of knowledge emerges a picture of reality perceived common-
ly by a group of people and which sets the context for all 
further human activity and thought in that society. 
Finally, within this common body of knowledge, reality 
for an individual or group is differentiated by degrees of 
familiarity. The whole of the social body of knowledge is 
not familiar to any one individual or group. Knowledge is 
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socially distributed. A particular social distribution 
of knowledge determines various individual and group percep-
tions of everyday reality. 
b. Institutionalization. "Institutionalization" is 
the result of habitualized activity. Social institutions 
arise out of historically created social bodies of knowledge 
and are the products of "reciprocal typification of habitu-
alized actions" 11 by different groups or individuals within 
a society. What was first subjectively perceived by in-
dividuals within a social group has now become tangible and 
independent of the individual. Ideally, a group's social 
structure embodies the reality confronting that group and 
thus is relevant and corresponds to the needs of those within 
the group. In short, social institutions represent the cul-
mination of a historical social construction of reality which 
confronts the individual as an objective and externally imposed 
reality. 
c. Legitimation. Institutions acquire and retain their 
power of control primarily through a process of legitimation 
by which individuals come to perceive institutions not as 
creations of subjectively expressed human activity, but as 
historical realities existing independently. Institutions 
have to be understood in their historical context. Once 
they have passed down through several successive generations 
they no longer reflect directly the human activities of the 
present society and may even appear as wholly alien and un-
related to the lives of the society's members. Survival 
of the institutions depends upon an on-going process of 
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legitimation. The social reality as embodied in institutions 
needs to be explained and justified. 
The process of explaining and justifying institutions 
rests upon the transmission of certain values and knowledge. 
Legitimation is most visibly and forcibly pursued through 
outright political and economic coercion of a society by 
those presiding over that society's institutions. However, 
a much more common, continuous, and powerful process of 
legitimation occurs less overtly. The problem of legitima-
tion confronts the individual rather than the institution 
itself. 
In modern society, the division of labor is responsible 
for the growth of specialized activities. Specialization 
entails the need for "role-specific" knowledge which rep-
resents but one fragment of the social body of knowledge. 
Specialization requires a social distribution of knowledge. 
Individuals and individual groups thus operate within sub-
universes of the greater body of social knowledge which is 
responsible for the social construction of reality. The 
problem for these individuals and groups is to integrate 
meaningfully their own fragmented social experience and 
knowledge into the whole of the social body of experience 
and knowledge. Legitimation of social institutions actually 
becomes in this context a legitimating of one's own limited 
subjective experience to correlate that experience with 
one's perception of the whole society. The individual 
feels compelled to legitimate his own experience in relation 
to the society-at-large because of his own perception of the 
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massive objectivity of that society. The burden of legiti-
mation consequently shifts to individuals and groups within 
a society, ironically solving the problem of legitimation 
for the social institutions themselves. 12 
The full circle of Berger's and Luckmann's dialectical 
relationship between the social reality and the human enter-
prise of constructing that reality i~ now evident. The 
need for individuals and groups within societies to legiti-
mize objective reality coexists with their need to defend 
their own subjective perception of reality based upon 
limited knowledge acquired in everyday activity. These 
subjective perceptions become externalized as they are ex-
pressed through daily activity. The dialectical process 
recommences: externalization brings forth objectivation 
and institutionalization which necessitates internalization 
and legitimation. 
2. Multiple Realities, Competing Realities. Berger's 
and Luckmann's delineation of the process of reality con-
struction can be extended to provide new insight into 
multiply perceived realities. From their account of an 
objectified, institutionalized, and legitimized reality 
arising out of a society's single social body of knowledge 
emerges a clearer understanding of similar processes within 
a genuinely fragmented society where distinct social bodies 
of knowledge coexist. Chilean society, in particular, 
constitutes several social sectors, each with its own common 
body of knowledge and unique perception of an objective 
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reality. Each social sector acquires a corresponding social 
body of knowledge--knowledge about daily life common to all 
within the sector. The social body of knowledge is based 
upon a group's acquired set of historical facts which cor-
porately constitute an objective reality unique to that group. 
This objective reality dialectically reflects the living ex-
periences of the group while shaping its subsequent ex-
pectations, aspirations, and perceived limits of action. 
In a society as fragmented as Chile's, the existence 
of multiply perceived realities reflects the actual his-
torical diversity of the population. No singular reality 
confronts all social sectors similarly and simultaneously. 
It thus becomes more useful to ask not which perceived real-
ity is indeed the imagined "objective reality" for the 
society as a whole, but what is objective reality for whom? 13 
However, for the outsider who looks in upon a society 
and even to many insiders, there often appears to be one 
overriding objective reality because one social sector's 
perceived reality dominates. The reward for the dominating 
reality is institutionalization and legitimation at the national 
level: it becomes accepted as the legitimate national re-
ality. New questions arise. Which social sector, which 
class, which population group wields the power to propagate 
its version of reality defined in its common body of know-
ledge at the national or societal level? What combination 
of social, political, and economic power is necessary? How 
crucial is this power? A response to the first question is 
not too difficult when power within a society is concentrated 
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and some form of absolute government exists. It is less 
easy to respond to the first question when power does not 
clearly reside in the hands of one group, as in the case 
of Allende's Chile, even though Chile historically had 
known a relatively consistent concentration of power in 
the hands of one segment of society. A response to the second 
question would be the envy of all analysts and power-seekers 
the world around, and though worthy of creative consider-
ation, it does not practically lie within the scope of this 
paper. Finally, how crucial is the power to propagate a 
particular version of perceived reality at the societal level? 
A response to this last question becomes apparent after 
recognizing the significance of the legitimating process for 
an institutionalized reality. All social sectors within a 
society become controlled and tangibly affected by that 
society's institutions, albeit to varying degrees. The sheer 
force of these institutions should not be underestimated. 
Responsive or not to the daily realities which confront the 
population sectors, established institutions dominate a 
society by their massive physical presence, reinforced by an 
appearance of historical detachment and independence from 
all human activity and perception. Any reality socially 
constructed by one population group which becomes institu-
tionalized acquires a subsequent legitimacy in the eyes of 
nearly all people. Ultimately, though an institutionalized 
reality remains relevant only to that social sector whose 
living experiences gave rise to the perceived reality, it 
no longer is associated with the particular social sector. 
Still very subjectively perceived and no more valid or ob-
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jective than another group's perceived reality, the institu-
tionalized reality becomes perceived as the one genuine ob-
jective reality, free of class bias, for the entire society. 
Not only do the other sectors of society find their own just 
as meaningful and tangibly felt realities ignored, but they 
pay a tremendous physical and psychological price for the 
discrepancey between what is real for them and what is ac-
knowledged as real for them by the institutions which control 
or significantly affect their lives. In many countries, 
especially LDC's, the price paid is manifested in broad 
socio-political and economic exploitation14 by national in-
stitutions indifferent to the realities of many sectors' 
harsh living conditions. 
The success and endurance of a set of institutions, 
as evidenced in continuation of the legitimation process, 
depends on the capability to reflect the social experiences 
and to meet the social needs of whichever social sector 
gains part or all of the crucial power to institutionalize 
its perception of reality. When the power to institution-
alize one particular perceived reality no longer clearly 
resides with one population group, competition occurs among 
the various social sectors to promote the institutionaliza-
tion of their respective objectified social bodies of know-
ledge. This competition is more familiarly known as "class 
conflict" and describes the state of Allende's Chile. Such 
class conflict is characterized by a breakdown in the legit-
imating process. Certain social sectors no longer perceive 
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the social institutions as historically independent, as 
legitimate, Individuals within those social sectors become 
more consciously aware of the reality of their lives and of 
the irrelevancy and unresponsiveness of the social institu-
tions to that reality. To summarize, the decay of a nation's 
socio-political structure is evidence of a breakdown in the 
legitimation process for a set of social institutions em-
bodying a particular perceived reality. 15 
IV. Allende's Chile 
Two objectives were clear in constructing a framework 
with which to study selected literature on Chile. First, 
I hoped to uncover points of departure from which analysts 
view the Allende period. Second, I desired to explore the 
perceptual processes utilized by experts to analyze and judge 
Allende's Chile. This latter objective, however, was hindered 
by many analysts' failure to formulate and/or utilize an ex-
plicit theoretical or perceptual framework with which to 
study the Chilean situation. Many scholarly articles were 
stimulating and informative descriptions, but few sought ser-
iously to probe beyond the surface. Fewer still were self-
conscious about their paradigms. 
In my initial attempts to construct a framework per-
mitting categorization of representative articles on Allende's 
Chile, I was wary of falling into a simplistic, two-pronged 
outlook which categorized articles according to their leftist 
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or rightist, pro-Allende or anti-Allende approach, I searched 
to uncover the basis for at least one other more centrist, 
less absolute position, incorporating perhaps perspectives 
from both political sides. Later, I also sought to avoid 
labeling the articles in political terms at all. Only after 
several attempts to formulate a seemingly more sophisticated 
framework did I realize the futility of ignoring the in-
creasingly intense politicization and polarization occuring 
within Chile preceding and during Allende's presidency. Dur-
ing the sixties and into the seventies, consistent policies 
were followed only by extremists of both ends of the nation's 
political spectrum; politically centrist positions fluctuat-
ed and became increasingly undermined. Thus, in 1973, the 
less revolutionary Communist Party (CP) found itself comp~lled 
to support radical workers' demands, under pressure from 
activist leftist groups advocating immediate socialization 
and revolutionary change. Similarly, the once relatively 
centrist Christian Democrat Party (PDC) went so far as to 
advocate outright rebellion and a military overthrow of the 
democratically-elected Allende government--a recourse once 
perceived to be shockingly illegal and advocated by only the 
extreme fascist right. 
Such a socio-political climate inevitably influenced 
the nature of the articles written about Allende's Chile. 
Though a few articles did search for a more subtle and less 
easily categorized explanation for the cause of Allende's 
failure, most analyses represented one of two general per-
spectives: the first, resembling a politically leftist 
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viewpoint, emphasized structural and external factors which 
rendered Allende's experiment very difficult; the second, 
tending to coincide with the Chilean opposition, stressed 
Allende's own faults and mistaken policies. 
(Note the compendium of selected articles on Allende's 
Chile and the diagram summarizing these two broad perspec-
tives on the following three pages.) 
1a. Allende's Political Leadership: A View From the Left. 
Though Allende's downfall is primarily attributed to the 
inherent contradictions of Chilean society and the forces of 
dependent capitalism, he is criticized for failing to mobil-
ize and consolidate the Left while too often seeking to 
pacify a hostile and uncooperative opposition. Allende is 
faulted for not realistically confronting the issue of power 
in a class-divided society, where power means survival. Thus, 
the Left's judgement of Allende's political leadership pro-
ceeds both sympathetically and critically. Ultra-leftist, 
more revolutionary groups such as the Socialist Party and the 
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) tended more openly 
to criticize Allende while Center-left, more reformist-
minded groups such as the GP tended to sympathize with the 
difficulty of Allende's undertaking. 
More specifically, leftist critics accused Allende of 
being blinded by post-electoral euphoria and of failing 
to realize the necessity of consolidating the mass base of 
the UP into, as T. V. Sathyamurthy states, "a coherent in-
strument for the effective articulation of political power. 1116 
Compendium of Selected Literature 
on Allende's Chile 
Offering Two General Perspectives 
A Leftist Perspective 
1. Petras, James and Morley, Morris. "Chilean Destabilization 
and Its Aftermath: An Analysis and a Critique." Politics, 
11, No. 2 (November, 1976), 140-48. 
2. Feinberg, Richard E. "Dependency and the Defeat of 
Allende." Latin American Perspectives, 1, No. 2 ( Summer, 
1974)' 30-43. 
3. Sathyamurthy, T. v. "Chile: Parliamentary Socialism 
and Class Struggle." Economic and Political Weekly, 10, 
No. 14 (April 5, 1975), 583-587; and, 10, No. 15 (April 
12, 1975), 623-634. 
4. Joxe, Alain. 11 o'b. vont les militaires chiliens?" Politigue 
Etrang~re, 39, No. 1 (1974), 55-71. 
5, Kay, Cristobal. "Chile: The Making of a Coup d"Etat." 
Science and Society, 39, No. 1 (Spring, 1975), 3-25. 
6 . Spence, Jack. "Class Mobilization and Conflict in Allende's 
Chile: A Review Essay." Politics and Society, 8, No. 2 
( 1978), 131-164. 
7. Sandri, Renato. "Chile: Analysis of an Experiment and a 
Defeat." Science and Society, 40, No. 2 (Summer, 1976), 
194-219. 
8. Goldberg, Peter A. "The Politics of the Allende Overthrow 
in Chile." Political Science Quarterly, 90, No. 1 
(Spring, 1975), 93-116. 
A Rightist Perspective 
1. Falcoff, Mark. "Why Allende Fell." Commentary, 62, No.1 
(July, 1976), 38-45. 
-24-
2. Holden, David. "Allende and the Myth Makers: Political 
Realism and Revolutionary Romance," Encounter, 42, No. 1 
(January, 1974), 12-24. 
J. Powelson, John P. "What Went Wrong in Chile?" Cultures 
et Dlveloppement, 6, No. J (1974), 483-500. 
4. Bourricaud, Francois. "Chili: l'Engrenage." Contrepoint, 
12 (November, 1974), 21-37. 
5, Jordan, David C. "Peron's Return, Allende's Fall and 
Communism in Latin America." Orbis, 17, No. J (Fall, 
1973), 1025-1052. 
6. Sigmund, Paul E. "Allende in Retrospect." Problems of 
Communism, 23, No. J (May-June, 1974), 45-62. 
PARTICULAR 
EMPHASES 
Politics 
and polit-
ical 
leadership 
Economics 
Nature of 
the UP co-
alition 
government 
Nature of 
the oppos-
ition 
-25-
WHY ALLENDE FAILED 
VIEWED FROM ULTRA-LEFT 
AND LEFT 
Personal failings of 
Allende as a revolu-
tionary leader 
Allende experienced 
and capable, but 
sought unprecedented 
change which threat-
ened a powerful bour-
geois elite 
Structural weaknesses 
of Chilean political 
economy 
Disunity of the 
Unidad Popular 
A unified domestic and 
foreign opposition, 
inseparably linked 
VIEWED FROM OPPOSITION 
Personal failings of 
Allende as a democrat-
ic leader: an uncom-
promising ideologue 
who did not understand 
the need for modera-
tion and common con-
sensus in a democracy 
Inept economic poli-
cies of the UP govern-
ment 
The UP: a minority 
regime incapable of 
national leadership 
which deliberately 
divided and polarized 
the nation 
A legitimate internal 
opposition indepen-
dent of foreign forces 
-26-
Some leftists feel Allende placed too much faith in Chile's 
constitutional bourgeois institutions--institutions which 
were designed to maintain the exploitative grip of the 
landed oligarchy and bourgeoisie. Had he been willing to 
admit just how little power was his, even as president, in 
a system committed to maintenance of bourgeois supremacy, 
Allende would have realized that his and the UP's survival 
depended upon strengthening the proletariat and peasant 
masses. Ties between the more politically conscious sec-
tors of the working class and peasantry and the entire work-
ing class and peasantry should have been encouraged in order 
to develop a powerful, cohesive mass movement capable of 
confronting an active and violent opposition. T. v. 
Sathyamurthy observes: 
The tragedy of Chile indeed lay in the fact that, 
throughout his presidency, Allende concentrated his efforts 
in containing and in fact thwarting the revolutionary up-
surge within the sphere of his support whereas those deter-
mined to force his regime out developed their violent 1 counterrevolutionary offensive without fearing reprisal. 7 
Indeed, when workers organized "cordones industriales" 
and "comandos comunales 1118 in response to the increasing 
domestic crisis, fomented in large part by disruptive 
Opposition tactics such as the October 1972 road transpor-
tation strike, Allende refused support. During the truck-
drivers' strike, Allende even declared state emergency 
rule in several major provinces, effectively handing over 
power to a hostile military, and invited military officers 
into his Cabinet. Allende succeeded in buying time, dis-
pelling the crisis at hand and pacifying the Opposition, 
but this cost him much more in the long-term as it weakened 
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his own popular political base. The cordones industriales 
and commandos comunales strengthened the workers' position, 
but without Allende's support they were not sufficient to 
generate a broader worker and peasant class consciousness 
throughout the country. More significantly, the creation 
of a politically conscious and cohesive worker-peasant 
movement, knowledgeable and practically experienced in the 
use and control of power, failed to emerge. 
In summary, Allende's inability to effect real struc-
tural change in Chilean society and to maintain control 
over the political economy in the face of a powerful opposi-
tion offensive is little surprising for leftist critics. 
James Petras and Morris Morley note that "no efforts at 
increased ~conomi~ productivity and planning had a chance 
to succeed while the question of political power remained 
undecided. 1119 Cristobal Kay concludes: 
The Chilean experience can be viewed as vindicating 
the theory of the ''extreme" or "revolutionary" left which 
maintains that it is impossible to initiate a transition 
to socialism by working within the bourgeois institutional 
framework. 20 
On a sympathetic note, the Left also recognized the 
difficulty for any leader who sought unprecedented qualita-
tive change in Chilean society, and specifically in the 
Chilean economic structure. Allende and his UP recognized 
that Chile was an underdeveloped nation not capable of pro-
viding enough private, individual consumption goods--those 
produced in a capitalist market economy--to fulfill the basic 
needs of its people: Chile, under dependent capitalism, 
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was failing to provide for the critical needs of the majority 
of the population. Jack Spence provides a good historical 
perspective for the stagnant dependent capitalist Chilean 
economy--an economy controlled by a domestic oligarchy 
tied to foreign economic interests which had impoverished 
peasants and workers, creating a stagnant economy also ad-
verse to the interests of the petty and national bourgeoisie: 
State-sponsored import substitution industries had 
expanded the economy in the 1930's and 40's but had ex-
hausted their potential due to the narrow, elite market of 
consumers. In the late 50's and 60's increasing economic 
concentration throughout the economy and the penetration of 
foreign capital into the more modern industrial, wholesale, 
foreign-trade, and investment sectors had not ended economic 
stagnation and chronic inflation, nor broadened consumer 
demand. Though new modern enterprises tended to pay higher 
wages than traditional sectors, their capital intensive 
character did not significantly contribute to lowering 
unemployment. This stagnation, in turn, retarded retail 
enterprises (not yet concentrated into national franchise 
operations). Increasing foreign and domestic concentration 
hurt small and medium enterprises by weakening their com-
petitive position, buying them out, or otherwise driving 
them out of business. 21 
Allende perceived the need for new economic structures, 
for a new kind of market sensitive to the need for public 
goods rather than for private, individual goods. Allende's 
program of nationalization of U. s.-owned copper mines, 
nationalization of roost of the banking system, expropriation 
of all latifundia and middle-size farms, and expansion of 
the state sector of the national economy with a subsequent 
reduction in the private sector represented genuine change. 
A sharp break from the policies of his predecessors was 
perceived as essential in order to create a new, independent 
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political economy capable of meeting the critical needs 
of the general population. 
Such qualitative and unprecedented change necessarily 
threatened the privileged sectors of the society and gener-
ated serious opposition among the traditionally powerful. 
Consequently, many viewers from the Left acknowledged and 
emphasized Allende's uphill struggle. Goldberg summarizes 
Allende's failure: 
Allende's downfall was the result of the choices of 
public policy made by his government and the responses to 
those choices by key groups and elites both within and out-
side of Chile, including the United States. 22 
A cogent explanation of his ultimate failure in leader-
ship lies in his very determination to shift basic policies, 
and the consequent change in the conditions of political 
groups, already described, which made ineffective many of 
the conventional tools of Chilean presidents to maintain, 
broaden, and solidify their base of support. 23 
Allende's attempt at qualitative change did not create class 
conflict, but did spark a social and institutional power 
struggle in an already genuinely fragmented society. Allende's 
successes in raising worker and peasant class-consciousness, 
and providing a new vision for a less exploitative society, 
credit his name, even as these successes served to unite a 
hostile opposition. 
In summary, while some leftists criticized Allende for 
adhering too rigidly to bourgeois democratic practice, many 
others were only too aware of the power of the sectors threat-
ened by the UP program. To avoid an immediate Opposition 
revolt and coup, many claim that Allende was required to 
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work for change within the given constitutional structures 
of Chile. The dilemma facing Allende was one of adminis-
tering a capitalist economy while transforming it. Renato 
Sandri notes 
•.• the contradiction between the process of struc-
tural reform directed toward the painful birth of a new 
social order, and the continuing existence of the previous 
legal and constitutional super-structure, which had been 
created for the express purpose of defending the ownership 
system of the society. 24 
Allende had to walk a political tightrope for survival, 
pushing for broad social change while not leading the nation 
into further economic deterioration. He faced the problem 
of maintaining and increasing production while reducing the 
political and economic power of the dependent bourgeoisie 
and foreign multinationals. 
lb. Allende's Political Leadership: Opposition View. 
Allende's opposition emphasizes the relative stability of 
Chile preceding his presidency, thereby concentrating the 
blame for both his downfall and the disintegration of Chilean 
democracy on his own poor and divisive leadership. Allende 
is accused of having sown the seeds of his own destruction--
and that of Chilean democracy--by usurping power beyond his 
constitutional rights as president, and by deliberately 
encouraging division within the nation. From his first day 
in office, Allende challenged and threatened Chile's tra-
ditional institutions, deliberately fomenting class conflict. 
His provocative use of revolutionary slogans condoned in-
creasing societal violence and eroded whatever possibility 
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had existed for peaceful and orderly progress through 
national consensus. Moderate individuals and organizations 
were frightened into a defensive counterrevolutionary union 
with the Right. Allende's only success was in wrecking the 
middle ground of Chilean society and politics. 
Overconfident from a narrow 1970 electoral victory, 
Allende refused to seek cooperation from or conciliation 
with the moderate forces of the PDC in order to obtain a 
workable base of support within the Chilean legislature. 
Instead, Allende triumphantly declared that the UP would 
"go it alone," laying plans for a national plebiscite to 
abolish the two-house legislature with a single popular 
assembly, assuming the inevitability of a UP majority. 
Allende demonstrated his refusal to cooperate with the ex-
isting legislature on many an occasion. In October, 1971, 
the Congress passed a constitutional amendment limiting the 
excessive power of the president to socialize private 
enterprises without justification. Allende both refused 
the amendment and any attempt at compromise, precipitating 
a major institutional stalemate. Nationalization of private 
enterprises continued, displaying Allende's determination 
to bypass the legislature. John P. Powelson writes: 
President Allende was reputedly an astute politician. 
He had extraordinary skill in manipulating other politicians 
in legal ways. Some such manoeuvres became a comic opera. 
When Congress impeached his ministers, he shuffled around 
the portfolios, so that impeachment was invalid unless it 
was begun again for each new position. He could do this 
indefinitely. When he needed support, he brought the mil-
itary into the government; when criticism for this was ex-
cessive, he arranged their exit. He cleverly called for new 
institutions, such as people's courts, where old ones did 
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not work. He encouraged labour seizures of industries, 
which might then be nationalized legally because they were 
operating inefficiently. 
His astuteness, however, was confined to narrow man-
ipulations. He failed to see the necessity for a national 
consensus and for sound economic policies. Popular Unity's 
choice lay between the "ego trip" on the one hand, and com-
promise on the other. 26 
Allende antagonized the other constitutional branches 
of government and disregarded the limits of executive power 
and constitutionally-mandated roles of the legislature and 
courts. Using laws long out of use and employing emergency 
measures out of their original context in his pursuit of 
"instant socialization," Allende manipulated democracy to 
his own ends and undermined the spirit, if not always the 
letter, of the constitution. Concurrently, he sought to 
manipulate the public with confused and alternating doses 
of first legalist, then revolutionary, philosophies, never 
understanding the reality of democracy nor his responsibil-
ity to uphold the Chilean order. David Holden speaks for 
many in the Opposition who were puzzled, if not angered, 
by Allende's rhetorical blend of democracy and revolution: 
Revolutions are born of, or generate, sectional con-
flict--a fact of political life that Allende acknowledged 
every time he spoke of "overthrowing" what he called the 
11 bourgeois" state. But a democratic constitution rests 
upon consensus--a basic acceptance of the fact that the 
State represents more than a merely sectional interest. 
The second permits reform, but the first denies it; and there 
is no way of reconciling the two. 27 
Summing up more harshly the repercussions of Allende's 
political leadership, David Jordan states: 
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It was shocking that the Allende regime in less than 
three years had transformed the nation from a lawful pol-
ity to one inured to violence, assault, assassination and 
ideological views of law and justice. 28 
2a. Economics: From the Left. As noted above in a 
preliminary manner, the Left maintains that Allende's 
failure cannot be understood nor judged without recognizing 
the basic structural weaknesses of the Chilean political 
economy. No person of any political persuasion denies 
that Allende and the UP made mistakes. However, both sup-
porters and critics of Allende within the Left emphasize 
that his failure was not unrelated to the intrinsic pre-
cariousness of the Chilean political-economic system. 
The historical vulnerability of the Chilean economy 
arises out of its dependent ties to international capitalism. 
Sandri summarizes the reality of dependency for contem-
porary Chile at the time of Allende's election: 
Chile was a dependent country--dependent on the world 
imperialist market which, because of the fluctuations of 
the price of copper on the London exchange, made any attempt 
by the government to balance its budget a gamble--dependent 
on the technology and industry of the "metropolis" (from 
which even the simplest spare parts had to be imported); 
dependent on the financial institutions controlled directly 
or indirectly by Wall Street, which granted credits not for 
"development" but for mere survival, and into the bargain 
charged exorbitant interest. It was a country primarily 
and above all dependent on the United States corporations, 
which, after trifling initial investments in the copper 
mines granted to them as concessions, had made profits of 
about )08 billion dollars over a period of forty years. 29 
Such a dependent country is tightly bound and vulnerable 
to external, foreign circumstances and even to outright 
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dictation of its domestic policies. Dependent Chile suffered 
from a self-perpetuating political-economic cycle described 
by Goldberg: 
New presidents typically entered office with the econ-
omy operating at below capacity as a result of previously 
deflationary policies designed to dampen inflation. In-
creased government spending would stimulate the economy to 
reach full capacity, but beyond that point the rate of in-
flation would rise sharply since no new investment would 
be forthcoming to raise productive capacity. At this 
point the dominant direction of conflict would prompt the 
political elite to cut back on social programs so that in-
flation would not reach runaway levels.JO 
Initial economic successes led to inflationary declines 
which necessitated renewed austerity measures, the burden 
falling on the poor masses. A parallel rise and fall of 
individual governments occurred with each new period of 
austerity and social suffering, breeding increased class 
conflict. 
Allende was determined to stop this cycle in order to 
effect real improvement in the living standards of the masses. 
Speeding up agrarian reform and nationalizing foreign and 
domestic monopolies, Allende attempted a genuine redis-
tribution of the nation's wealth. When the imbalance between 
greater purchasing power of the masses and reduced supply 
on the market accelerated Chile's perennial inflation. he 
refused to cut back on social expenditures for the poor. 
Instead, he sought to trim the excessive wealth of the nation's 
economic elite--an elite tied to the powerful foreign mon-
opolies. This confrontation denied Allende the loans, aid, 
and credit available to his predecessors which had previ-
-35-
ously kept the dependent economy afloat. The crucial safe-
ty valve that foreign capital represented, "open" for Allende's 
predecessors, was firmly 11 shut 11 for Allende. This was the 
price paid for daring to tamper with the Chilean political-
economic structure and attempting to break out of historical 
dependency. 
2b. Economics: The Opposition's View. Allende invited 
economic disaster in Chile by pursuing a host of inept 
economic policies. Revolutionary dreams blinded Allende 
from economic reality. Political fantasizing rather than 
economic reasoning led to an irresponsible stab at the im-
possible. The UP government claimed to seek a strengthen-
ing of Chile's industrial and agricultural base while attack-
ing key sectors of that base. The UP government claimed 
that broadening the industrial-agricultural base would 
strengthen the Chilean economy, yet it pursued a policy 
of undermining the substantial private sector in an attempt 
to reduce Chile's economy to a state-controlled one. Ig-
noring basic economic laws of supply and demand in situations 
of scarcity, Allende irresponsibly promoted increased con-
sumption among large sectors of the population whose produc-
tivity did not rise, and even decreased. 
The UP ignored the resulting hyperinflation, oblivious 
to its consequences while derisively labeling it a "bourgeois, 
capitalist" problem not relevant to socialist economic planning. 
Instead, the UP impulsively embarked upon a much too rapid 
agrarian reform which caused severe rural dislocation and 
upheaval adverse to maintaining, let alone increasing, food 
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production. The necessity for more food imports only 
worsened Chile's negative balance of payments. Sudden 
nationalization of many firms reduced industrial efficiency 
and overall production levels. Inexperienced workers were 
expected to assume the responsibilities of industrial man-
agers overnight. Allende soon had to face the problem 
of an overextended, newly-created social sector which did 
not have the money to meet the higher wages decreed by the 
UP government, and lacked the expertise to achieve greater 
production. Paul E. Sigmund, critiquing UP economic policy, 
even implies the inconsistency of that policy according to 
marxist criteria: 
Marxist economists and policymakers have always placed 
primary emphasis on investment and the expansion of the 
productive capacity of the economy. By contrast, the Allende 
policymakers emphasized increases in consumption and com-
bined this with a headlong rush to take over industry and 
agriculture--a course far removed from the "two steps forward, 
one step back" of Lenin. The consequences of these policies 
after their deceptive initial success were massive govern-
ment deficits, runaway inflation, and a near-breakdown of 
the economy •. 3 l 
Dismissing the leftist portrayal of Allende as a victim 
of foreign pressures, Opposition critics deny that Allende's 
difficulties resulted from a cutoff in crucial foreign aid. 
First, any alleged u. s. influence to promote an international 
credit embargo against Chile did not prevent Chile from re-
ceiving increased aid from certain nations. Sigmund states: 
The argument that Allende's economic problems were the 
result of a shortage of foreign credit does not really hold 
water, since they were caused by policies initiated before 
the foreign squeeze and since, in any event, Allende's regime 
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managed to secure enough foreign credits from Latin America, 
European, Soviet and Chinese sources to increase the Chilean 
foreign debt from $2.6 billion to $J.4 billion in less than 
three years.3 2 
Second, whatever u. s. economic intervention within 
Chile or in Chilean international economic affairs did or 
did not occur, it is considered insignificant compared to 
the economic breakdown and political turmoil brought upon 
Chile by her own leaders. David Holden summarizes several 
of the preceding points in a stinging critique of the Allende 
government: 
... u. S. influence may have limited Western aid and 
credit but it was far from being able to condemn Allende's 
Chile to economic purdah. In any case, Chile was not one 
of the under-developed world's hard cases, totally dependent 
on external aid and credits for its survival ••• 
Unfortunately, nobody with even a nodding acquaintance 
with economics could have classified the management of the 
Allende government as anything but disastrous. To a great 
extent it placed itself beyond the pale for any but the most 
trusting--or dedicated--of creditors. But even if that had 
not been so, and if the blame for ChilP.'s economic difficul-
ties could have been laid fairly and squarely at Washington's 
door, Allende would surely have had small cause for complaint. 
It was, after all, his administration which announced its 
immediate determination to "expropriate imperialist capital ••• 
realise a policy of self-financing ••• and review, denounce 
and repudiate, as the case may be, treaties or agreements 
limiting our sovereignty, specifically the reciprocal assistance 
treaties, the mutual aid pacts, and others, between Chile and 
the United States" (The People's Unity--Basic Programme of 
Government, 1970). 3.3 
Finally, whatever aid Allende did lose from the u. S. 
is not surprising given his needless challenging of u. s. 
interests. Specifically, his failure to compensate for the 
nationalization of u. s. copper companies' mines amounted 
to outright confiscation. Mark Falcoff, implying the neutral 
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or apolitical character of the international economic system, 
observes: 
••• to refuse a defaulted debtor additional credit is 
not prima facie an act of internal subversion--it is a 
rather ordinary, humdrum business practice.34 
Allende and his government are thus held responsible for 
the unprecedented economic chaos that led to a deterioration 
of Chile's traditionally stable social and political in-
stitutions. 
Ja. The Unidad Popular: Self-Image. Just as explan-
ations of Allende's failure are contingent upon different 
evaluations of his political leadership and his government's 
economic policies, the nature and intent of the UP and 
Opposition coalitions are perceived differently depending on 
one's socio-political point of departure. 
The diversity--or contradiction--of the UP is revealed 
by the strategic philosophies of its two major components, 
the Communist and Socialist Parties. Committed to a legal 
path to socialism, the CP deemed it essential to avoid 
scrupulously a confrontation between the Right and Left 
which would encourage a brutal repression of the Left by 
the Opposition military and bourgeois forces. In contrast, 
the SP generally represented a more radical leftist group 
which qualified its participation· in the UP coalition by 
an insistence upon the temporary nature of any electoral 
strategy: the electoral path could only achieve limited 
socialist advancement and could not replace the inevita-
bility of violent confrontation with the bourgeoisie. Key 
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components of the CP strategy, "gradualism," "reformism, 11 
and "constitutionalism," did not ideologically coincide 
with the SP's call for "uncompromised advancement" and 
"revolutionary transformation." 
The Left generally acknowledges that the UP coalition 
was one of political convenience hastily organized to pre-
pare for the 1970 elections. Though admitting that the diverse 
compos:ttion of the UP rendered cohesive and unified action 
difficult, leftists emphasize that the UP represented a 
majority of the people--this was its strength. However, 
after the UP electoral victory, agreement on policy and action 
between its ideologically disparate elements was not only 
difficult, but often impossible. Internal division pre-
vented the UP from rallying around the Allende government 
and effectively combatting the increasingly vocal and violent 
Opposition. Renato Sandri discusses the cause of the UP 
government's loss of authority and initiative: 
Within the (irfl alliance, unfortunately, the discus-
sion often took the form of justification of partisan 
positions rather than an attempt to clarify the issues before 
the country, to warn the people of the great peril to dem-
ocratic institutions, and to mobilize the entire population 
behind the program of Unidad Popular.35 
Cristobal Kay makes a similar observation: 
During ••• 1971-1973 ••• the UP could have developed the 
objective and subjective conditions for decisively defeat-
ing the bourgeoisie and initiating the transition to social-
ism. That the UP was not able to overcome many of the ob-
stacles in its way was the result largely of internal 
differences. Neither the "reformists" nor the ''revolutionaries" 
were dominant within the UP and the lack of a coherent 
strategy resulted in a middle-of-the-road policy which 
responded to events rather than shaped them. It was the 
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absence of a unified public leadership that prevented the 
UP from exploiting and channeling the mobilized power of 
the masses towards armed insurrection.36 
The weakness of the UP is particularly exemplified by 
the aftermath of the June, 1972 Lo Curro Conference, a 
high-level strategy meeting. Allende and the more moderate 
leftists argued for the consolidation of gains already 
made, implying a freeze on both socialization of the econ-
omy and worker-peasant mobilizations. But more radical 
socialists felt the Left's best defense was to continue 
the socializing process without hesitation. Popular mobil-
izations should be encouraged. Inflation must be fought 
not by reducing the masses' buying power but by raising 
taxes on luxury goods and lifestyles. The final agreement 
to pursue Allende's consolidationist approach was tenuous. 
While the UP government thus sought to renew talks with the 
Opposition about defining the limits of the UP-created 
social sector, a key cause of the legislative-executive 
deadlock, workers took over three more factories. The UP 
tried to discourage these mobilizations, but when the workers 
generated wide support from workers' committees elsewhere, 
the UP was forced to accede to the workers' demands to in-
corporate the three factories into the social sector. Con-
sequently, talks with the Opposition broke down. Another 
occasion for compromise was lost as the nation drifted 
toward a hardening polarization. Spence disavows simple 
explanations that the ultra-left stirred up trouble or 
Allende alienated the masses: 
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If popular mobilizations in the late 1960's contributed 
to the UP electoral victory, UP policies after 1970 created 
conditions for more militant mobilizations. One condition--
the bourgeoisie's diminished control over the state's re-
pressive force--has been mentioned. The installation of 
worker participation and peasant collectives gave unprece-
dented power to these groups. They made newly nationalized 
establishments work, though oftentimes with a good many 
problems, including absenteeism, and resultant inefficiency. 
Their successes, and increased material benefits gained 
in wage negotiations with the state, led other groups to 
initiate takeovers, and the success of these initiatives 
led to more. Some forces within the UP encouraged and or-
ganized these actions, and even less militant UP forces 
initially wanted to better the bargaining position of the UP 
by "stampeding" the disorganized opposition. Moreover, 
the political danger of attempting to stop militant take-
overs prevented decisive action against them. The dilemma 
of the consolidation line lay in the implication that its 
implementation would require repressing mobilizations.37 
The choice of encouraging or confronting popular mobil-
izations was just one of the dilemmas facing the UP leader-
ship. Given the diversity of the UP, one can better under-
stand why Allende was both criticized and praised within 
his own ranks. However, the consequences of the UP's divis-
iveness become no clearer than when Allende is violently 
overthrown. 
Jb. Unidad Popular: Defined by the Opposition. Though 
both leftists and rightists recognize the UP's division 
as a primary contributing factor in Allende's downfall, 
leftist dismay at this division gives way to Opposition 
condemnation. The UP is portrayed as a minority regime 
incapable of effective national leadership which in its 
own weakness deliberately sought to polarize the nation. 
First, the Opposition rejects the UP's claim to a 
popular, majority base. Specifically, the 1973 Congressional 
elections are cited as proof of a decline in the UP's pub-
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lie support from the 1970 municipal elections and of the 
existence of an anti-marxist majority. Consequently, not 
only was the UP coalition intrinsically weak due to the in-
compatible philosophies represented within it, the UP did 
not express the desires of a majority of the population. 
Yet Allende insisted on carrying out the UP program even 
though he lacked majority support of the people, which he 
had originally declared necessary to justify the policies 
of his government. 
Secondly, Opposition critics point out that the in-
trinsic contradiction of the UP prevented it from exerting 
sound and cohesive national leadership. While some elements 
of the UP professed democratic, pluralist, and liberterian 
ideals, other elements advocated armed confrontation and 
revolutionary struggle. Both groups consistently clashed 
in and out of the government, not only paralyzing the govern-
ment the UP was supposed to lead, but dangerously polariz-
ing the nation. 
In summary, while leftists regretfully acknowledge the 
divisions of the UP which contributed to the failure of 
Allende's government, the Opposition vehemently denounced 
a coalition government so divided that it was unable to 
govern the country, creating a vacuum of national leader-
ship and political power which threatened the very existence 
of the Chilean nation. 
4a. The Opposition: Defined by the Left. The Left 
claims that one inseparably linked domestic and foreign 
opposition collaborated from the first day of Allende's 
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presidency to bring him down through deliberate political 
and economic sabotage. In the wake of popular mobilizations 
where qualitative demands for more decision-making power 
and control of the means of production increasingly super-
ceded traditional quantitative demands for basic goods and 
higher wages, a powerful domestic alliance fought back. 
The bourgeoisie, professionals, petty bourgeoisie, and mil-
itary were determined to preserve their positions of polit-
ical and economic advantage, regardless of the consequences 
to the economy or to the democratic institutions of Chile. 
The resulting crisis atmosphere only frightened previously 
more neutral middle sectors into the Opposition camp. 
Jack Spence states how the role of foreign forces was 
crucial in this strategy: 
The u. S., substantially weakened by its misadventure 
in Indochina, was in no position to dispatch the Marines, 
in the classic imperialist pattern, played out in Latin 
America most recently in the Dominican Republic, of over-
throwing a government leaning dangerously to the left. 
Though it explored various CIA models for overthrow, gen-
eral bungling, a strong institutionalized left with a mass 
base, and a complicated political and military structure 
prevented a Guatemala-type coup in the early years of the UP. 
The U. S. was left with aiding right-wing allies in the 
joint strategy of creating economic chaos.38 
Spence points out how even a weakened u. s., due to Chile's 
dependent economy and U. s. international economic strength, 
was able to accelerate Chile's internal chaos by cutting 
off credits to Chile and financing anti-Allende groups. 
Petras enlarges upon the U. s. role: 
The intensifying anti-government activity within Chile 
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was carefully coordinated with u. S. policy designed to 
further weaken the economy. Loans and credits from public, 
private and international banks were cut off and shipments 
of essential parts for U. s.-produced machinery were in-
explicably "delayed." On the direct action front, U. s. 
financing of opposition activity--especially the truck owners' 
lockout--was evidenced by the large influx of dollars which 
recently stabilized for over a month the price of the dollar 
on the black market.39 
Finally, both Spence and Petras respectively place the U, S. 
role in perspective: 
u. S. efforts were not sufficient by themselves to 
overthrow Allende, but they were necessary for the anti-
Allende groups to be able to create the conditions for the 
military to intervene. 40 
The coup thus was neither solely the product of the 
CIA nor the result of purely Chilean forces, but a com-
bined effort resulting from the shared interests of both 
the U. s. and the Chilean bourgeoisie and its military 
11 . 41 a ies. 
To summarize, the Left views the Opposition as a bour-
geois, class-based alliance which responded not to economic 
and political deterioration but to the political challeng-
ing of their elitist position within Chilean society. For-
eign manipulation and intervention aided and encouraged 
the domestic opposition. The CIA and some U. s. corpora-
tions contributed to the financing of fascist groups and 
violent fascist activities as well as to the financing of 
Opposition medias, parties, and strikes. The Chilean mil-
itary continually received aid in the form of weapons and 
tactical "know-how" from its U. S. counterpart. U. s. 
and u. s.-dominated international financial institutions 
cancelled credit and loans to Chile. Indeed, the Opposition 
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solidified and grew increasingly violent in direct propor-
tion to Allende's success in extending greater benefits 
and responsibilities to the masses in his effort to create 
a more equitable society and independent society capable 
of sustained and self-generated growth. Allende's alleged 
economic mistakes were not responsible for the hardened 
opposition. Rather, growing polarization reflected gen-
uine class war in a battle of high stakes. 
4b. The Opposition: Self-Image. The Opposition denies 
that foreign intervention was the decisive factor in en-
abling a "domestic elite" to preserve its position and 
bring Allende down. First, though some Allende critics 
admit the obvious role of the u. s. in Chile, they insist 
that no such foreign intervention, covertly or overtly, 
could have significantly altered the balance of power be-
tween the UP and the Opposition. No external manipulation 
could have succeeded without legitimate domestic discontent 
and unrest over Allende's policies. Secondly, Allende's 
opposition comprised not an elite but a majority of the 
population(based on the 1973 Congressional elections) which 
felt it imperative to combat the growing anarchy and threat 
of economic collapse resulting from Allende's policies and 
leadership. His inaction in the midst of increasing civil 
unrest and economic chaos alienated Chile's politically 
moderate middle sectors, whose own economic positions were 
being threatened by uncontrolled workers' strikes and fac-
tory takeovers. The general precariousness of both economy 
and government under Allende compelled these sectors to join 
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the more extreme right-wing forces to end the stagnation 
and deterioration characterizing UP rule. Indeed, it is 
the UP government which was responsible for sending Chilean 
society on the road of suicidal polarization. Consequently, 
there existed a legitimate domestic opposition to Allende 
independent of foreign forces. 
Ultimately, a professional, law-abiding military, 
not associated with any particular sector of society, was 
forced to act to halt national decline, and to save its 
own organizational integrity. Allende had consciously 
brought the military into his power struggle with the Op-
position under the guise of upholding the constitution while 
actually subjecting it to narrow-minded UP partisanship. 
Allende's politicization of the military reflected his 
desire to co-opt it to serve his own political ends. But 
for the military, politicization was one short step from 
polarization and division within its own ranks. The mil-
itary understandably acted to prevent its own division and 
demise as a professional, autonomous institution. It was 
Allende who prompted the military overthrow of his govern-
ment. 
In summary, a rightist perspective describes Allende's 
opposition as legitimate and domestically based. In the 
end, a counterrevolutionary coup was the only alternative 
to prevent economic disaster and a political "dictatorship 
of the proletariat" by a government which had wholly under-
mined the spirit of constitutional democracy and had in-
excusably tolerated severe economic decline. 
v. Conclusion 
The focus of this study has been two-fold: an ex-
ploration of Allende's Chile coupled with a probe into Ber-
ger's and Luckmann's treatise in the sociology of knowledge. 
Briefly summarizing the process of my research, I initially 
attempted to explain Allende's downfall. This aim was mod-
ified as my appreciation for the complexity and multiplicity 
of perceived realities in Chile grew. Yet, analysts seemed 
to search for one particularly valid, more objective reality 
while employing innumerable perceptual approaches. I thus 
attempted to bring together some of these analytical ap-
proaches by devising a broad framework around them. Though 
achieving some success in this endeavor, I was increasingly 
bothered by analysts' frequent failure to self-consciously 
construct explicit paradigms to guide their work and to 
honestly present their own socio-political, economic, theo-
retical and/or intellectual points-of-departure. Equally 
troubling were analysts' often implicit acceptance of the 
notion of a singular, objective reality. A desire for clar-
ity and absolute understanding consistently prevailed on 
their part, even when analytical integrity demanded the 
recognition of occasional perceptual ambiguity. Especially, 
my own observations began to center on multiply perceived 
realities which shared legitimacy and objectivity among 
different social sectors within the diverse Chilean society. 
I was consequently motivated to explore how knowledge of 
objective reality is acquired and socially created. Thus, 
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I used Berger's and Luckmann's description of the process 
of reality-construction to guide my study of Allende's 
Chile. 
Linking these two bodies of research requires one 
final question. What does Allende's Chile teach us about 
social constructions of reality? In particular, what can 
be inferred about the institutionalization of dominant 
realities, about the nature of political and economic power, 
about reform and revolution? These are the ultimate ques-
tions to which this study leads. 
During the sixties, Chile experienced the progressive 
decline of a minority construction of reality which had 
historically dominated Chilean political and economic in-
stitutions. Allende's Chile in the early seventies repre-
sented the culmination of the disintegration of this insti-
tutionalized reality as another social sector (actually, 
another coalition of social sectors) sought to institution-
alize its own socially constructed reality. Allende's Chile 
became an excellent example of several perceptions of the 
social order--several social constructions of reality--
coexisting within one society and competing for institu-
tionalization, with the accompanying reward of legitimation 
at the national level. Thus, the theoretical description 
of the process of reality-construction and the tendency 
of social constructions of reality to coexist, to compete, 
and to seek institutionalization finds credibility in the 
practical experience of Allende's Chile. 
The significance of institutionalization for a par-
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ticular social construction of reality lies in the dia-
lectical process through which that reality is not only 
institutionalized but, in turn, thoroughly defines the 
response of the institutions to the society. New relevancy 
of the institutions to a particular social sector is achieved. 
The political and economic power associated with a nation's 
institutions directly supports and encourages those social 
sectors whose construction of reality is embedded in the 
national institutions. A dominant social reality, a na-
tion's institutions, and political-economic power are deeply 
intertwined. Class struggle in Allende's Chile exemplifies 
the process of multiple social constructions of reality 
vying for dominance through institutionalization. 
Finally, the recognition of social institutions as 
objectified constructions of reality by one or more social 
sectors reveals the fundamental contradiction of Allende's 
political experiment. Allende sought to initiate real, 
i.e., revolutionary, political, economic, and social change 
while rigorously seeking to maintain the existing national 
institutions. He assumed a reformer's distinction between 
sets of institutions and differently perceived social real-
ities. Yet for the institution which represents and is even 
created by a particular social construction of reality, 
such a distinction is not evident. Therefore, effective 
and qualitative change requires a new set of institutions 
responsive and relevant to the new dominant social reality. 
Allende confused reform for revolution, failing to recog-
nize that institutions are intrinsically enmeshed within 
one historically perceived objective reality. 
1 
2 
Peter L. Berger 
tion of Reality 
1967 ) . 
FOOTNOTES 
and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construe-
( New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 
Ibid., PP• 53-67. 
J Steven J. Rosen and Walter S. Jones, The Logic of Inter-
national Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop 
Publishers, Inc., 1977), 167. 
4 Dependency theorists such as Andr6 Gundar Frank and 
Osvaldo Sunkel provide insightful views into the nature 
of the international capitalist political and economic 
system. An important dependency concept is that of a 
linked world "center" and world "periphery," the latter 
experiencing different degrees of domination by the first. 
Suggested readings are: Andr~ Gundar Frank, Latin America: 
Underdevelo ment or Revolution ( New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 19 9 ; and Osvaldo Sunkel, "Big Business and 
'Dependencia'," Foreign Affairs, 50 (April, 1972), 517-Jl. 
5 Terminology itself reflects a peculiar perception of reality 
based upon different personal experiences and values. 
Reference to "small business owners" does not yield the 
same connotation as "petty bourgeoisie." I have chosen the 
first term at this point to present a seemingly less colored 
notion of those independent and semi-independent capitalist 
entrepreneurs who comprise an important segment of the 
middle class. 
6 Federico Gil, The Political S~stem of Chile (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 196 ), 22-27. 
7 Renato Sandri, "Chile: Analysis of an Experiment and a 
Defeat," Science and Society, 40, No. 2 (1977), 198. 
8 Debate has occurred among socialists over whether a 
"labor aristocracy" existed or not within the proletariat. 
For contrasting views, see T.V. Sathyamurthy, "ChiJm: 
Parliamentary Socialism and Class Struggle--Part II," 
Economic and Political Weekly, 10, No. 15 ( 1977 ) , 628; 
and Sandri, p. 212. 
9 For an understanding of "economism'' among Chile• s pro-
letariat, see Sandri, p. 201. 
-51-
lO The social body of knowledge is subject to change, either 
through addition or deletion of certain "facts." Hence, 
objective realities are never static or absolute. 
11 
12 
Berger and Luckmann, p. 54. 
Though social institutions often succeed in an ongoing 
process of legitimation due to their massive presence 
in society, one must be careful in assuming this process 
of explanation and justification is automatic. Indeed, 
Allende's Chile is an all too clear illustration of what 
happens when the legitimating process breaks down. 
lJ Allende's Chile exemplifies the danger for the analyst 
of assuming that a national society embraces but one so-
cial body of knowledge portraying one perceived objective 
reality. 
14 Exploitation not only refers to deliberate subjugation 
of one population group for another group's well-being, 
but also can be defined as inaction in the face of ser-
ious suffering by those with the power to relieve or 
lessen the suffering. 
l5 It is worth noting that institutional decay is itself 
neither necessarily a good or bad process. From one 
perspective, such decay is viewed as courting disastrous 
disorder, uncertainty, and instability one step away 
from national destruction and suicide. From another 
perspective, institutional decay paves the way for a 
readaptation of societal institutions to contemporary 
human conditions--for a reassertion of human energy over 
institutions, humanly created, but now alienating and 
obsolete. In this light, institutional decay permits 
a positive reconstitution of relevant reality reflecting 
current social experiences and needs. 
16 Sathyamurthy, P• 625. 
17 T. v. Sathyamurthy, "Chile: Parliamentary Socialism 
and Class Struggle--Part I," Economic and Political 
Weekly, 10, No. 14 (April 5, 1975), 586. 
18 The "cordones industriales" were industrial belts or-
ganized by the industrial proletariat and the "comandos 
comunales" were grass root organizations seeking to unite 
the industrial proletariat, urban slum dwellers, and lo-
cal peasant councils. See Cristobal Kay, "Chile: The 
Making of a Coup d'Etat," Science and Society, 39 No.1 
-52-
( 1975), p. 6-7. 
l9 Betty and James Petras, 0 Ballots into Bullets: Epitaph 
for a Peaceful Revolution," Ramparts, 12, No. 4 (1973), 
28. 
20 Kay, p. 24. 
21 Jack Spence, "Class Mobilization and Conflict in Allende's 
Chile: A Review Essay," Politics and Society, 8, No. 2 
(1978), 14:t.. 
22 Peter A. Goldberg, "The Politics of the Allende Over-
throw in Chile," Political Science Quarterly, 90, No. 1 
( 1975 ) , 93. 
23 4 Ibid., P• 10 • 
24 Sandri, p. 203. 
25 Ibid., P• 200-201. 
26 John P. Powelson, "What Went Wrong in Chile?" Cultures 
et Dlveloppement, 6, No. 3 ( 1974), p. 493. 
27 David Holden, "Allende and the Myth Makers: Political 
Realism and Revolutionary Romance," Encounter, 42, No. 1 
(1974), 22. 
28 David C. Jordan, "Peron's Return, Allende's Fall and 
Communism in Latin America," Orbis, 17, No. 3 (1973 ) , 
1042. 
29 Sandri, p. 197-198. 
JO Goldberg, p. 103. 
3l Paul E. Sigmund, "Allende in Retrospect," Problems 
of Communism, 23, No. 3 ( 1974 ) , 61. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Holden, p. 15. 
34 Mark Falcoff, ":Why Allende Fell," Commentary, 62, No. 1 
( 1976)' 42. 
-53-
35 6 Sandri, p. 21 • 
36 Cristobal Kay, "The Chilean Road to Socialism: Post 
Mortem," Science and Society, 40, No. 2 (1976 ) , 226. 
37 Spence, P• 149. 
38 Ibid., p. 162. 
39 Petras, p. 28. 
40 Spence, P· 162. 
41 Petras, P• 28. 
